Posted by: John Phoenix
Global Research,
In-depth Report: THE BALKANS
Giannis Valinakis, who served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece between 2004 and 2009 and currently serves as the President of the Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence at the University of Athens, stated the following during an interview on a Greek television channel:
“I think that NATO will no longer provide any guarantees to Greece. Greece’s security environment is deteriorating.
NATO is under serious pressure, and this pressure comes primarily from the Americans.
In fact, it is being discussed whether NATO will survive in the long term. Article 5, that is, support for an ally that has been attacked, is becoming weaker with Trump’s statements. Europe is also weakening internally. Although it appears that we are trying to understand the extent of the risks and adapt to the changes of the era, instead of a Europe where 27 countries are listened to one by one, we are now moving toward a Europe where three or four leaders exercise power and the others follow.”
To read this article in the following languages, click the Translate Website button below the author’s name.
Türkçe, Русский, Español, 中文, Portugues, Français, عربي, Hebrew, Deutsch, Farsi, Italiano, 日本語, 한국어, Српски. And 40 more languages.
In fact, Valinakis has diagnosed the geopolitical climate quite accurately. This assessment comes at a time when the EU seeks endless war with Russia, yet Russia continues to sell oil despite American embargoes, signs strategic cooperation and free trade agreements with India, and when major European leaders such as those of France, Britain, and Germany compete to meet with Chinese President Xi. Most strikingly, the NATO Secretary General encourages NATO to fight Russia on one hand, while thanking Trump on the other for his attempts to nearly seize Greenland. In this context, Valinakis’s words are not surprising at all. Today, European elites are making new situational assessments in panic, faced with Trump’s disruption of the rules-based world they trusted so deeply and the rise of naked power above law. Yet one must ask: were Greece and others unaware that the West was offering them the same unlawful and immoral support it has extended to Israel for decades?
The Fallacy of the Status Quo
Later in the program, Valinakis states:
“Türkiye is not an ordinary country. It is a country that is not satisfied with the status quo. We are content with our borders, but they are not. Türkiye is a country that tries to force us to accept changes to the basic balances in the Aegean, either through dialogue, crisis, or pressure.”
According to Valinakis, the “status quo” means accepting the impositions of the Seville map in the Aegean and Mediterranean, which confines Türkiye to its coastline; maintaining the continental shelf dispute frozen since 1976; preserving a 10-mile airspace claim; arming islands that are supposed to have non-military status; and refraining from raising the issue of islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty became disputed during the Kardak Crisis.
The following words in his statement are particularly revealing:
“The Turks even consider some areas behind Greek islands as their continental shelf. They are not satisfied with this. After the Kardak crisis, they revealed the gray zones and increased their number to 150 or perhaps even 200 points—200 small islands. Türkiye demands all of these in the Aegean. These are not theoretical matters. Finally, they even open large islands to discussion through the disarmament method.”
From these remarks, it is clear that an academic and politician who served for five years as Greece’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs can make statements that are detached from factual reality. He ignores the fact that the sovereignty of 23 islands was transferred to Greece under the explicit condition of demilitarization by the decisions of the Six Great Powers and by the Lausanne and Paris Peace Treaties. He assumes that 152 islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean were transferred to Greece without being named or geographically defined. He disregards the reality that extending territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean would virtually eliminate Türkiye’s freedom of passage to the Mediterranean and leave Türkiye with an almost absurd share—approximately 7%—of the Aegean continental shelf.
This distortion is not surprising. Since 1955, Greece has consistently instrumentalized international law by reshaping it according to its own perceptions. Exploiting its position as the West’s favored and spoiled child, Greece has justified actions by claiming, “I am arming the islands because Türkiye is arming.” Despite the Akritas Plans, Enosis initiatives, multiple coup attempts involving Grivas and Nikos Sampson, and the massacres of Turkish Cypriots, Greece has persistently portrayed itself to Western public opinion as a civilized nation oppressed by barbaric Turks.
Will Trumpism Infect the Aegean?
During the program, the host asks Valinakis:
“Will Türkiye use the dominance of the ‘law of the strong,’ which now shapes the international security system, to its advantage?”
Valinakis replies:
“This is precisely the issue. The institutions that protect the Greek approach and international law have become weaker and weaker. They are gradually being replaced by a Trump-style logic in which power relations supplant institutions and law. Strong leaders are emerging—leaders who want to redraw borders of the past. These leaders have both the will and the power to do so, and in such cases the weaker neighbor is forced to accept its fate. This is Trump’s logic, but Türkiye is not limited to such reactions. Türkiye is thinking about expansion—whether in Syria, Libya, or Cyprus—and through the Blue Homeland concept it is interested not only in maritime and submarine areas, but also in land territories.”
He continues:
“We, on the other hand, have taken shelter behind a wall. Within this framework, we talk about nothing other than the delimitation of the continental shelf within maritime jurisdiction areas. But this wall is now collapsing, because delimiting the continental shelf necessarily means negotiations. Even if we claim we are not negotiating, any delimitation is inherently a negotiation. The core issue is that we are proposing something the other side cannot accept. How can we delimit the continental shelf without first determining whether 160 or 200 islands, islets, and rocks belong to Türkiye or Greece? Such delimitation is impossible without resolving this question.”
The Main Problem in the Aegean: Kardak-Type Islands, Islets, and Rocks
For these statements, Valinakis deserves acknowledgment. He has accurately identified the central problem in the Aegean. Maritime delimitation and continental shelf determination are impossible without legally clarifying the sovereignty of 152+ islands, islets, and rocks between the two states. Under such circumstances, Greece’s attempt to extend territorial waters beyond six miles would face Türkiye’s objection at the casus belli level, even before considering the confusion created by formations of disputed sovereignty. Thus, without resolving the status of these 152+ assets through negotiations, continental shelf talks cannot truly begin, because the map itself is undefined. Moreover, it must be emphasized that no negotiation process with Greece should commence before demilitarized islands are returned to the Lausanne regime.
How Kardak Crisis Emerged
The concept of “Islands, Islets, and Rocks Whose Sovereignty Was Not Transferred to Greece by Treaties (EGAYDAAK)” emerged on December 25, 1995, when the Turkish merchant vessel Figen Akat ran aground on the Kardak Rocks off the Bodrum–Gümüşlük coast. These rocks lie 3.8 nautical miles from Gümüşlük and 5.5 nautical miles from Kelemez (Kalymnos) Island, which was transferred to Greece by Italy under the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty.
The crisis escalated when the ship’s captain refused Greek assistance and contacted the Turkish Coast Guard. What began as a maritime accident quickly transformed into a serious sovereignty dispute. The Simitis government, which had come to power in Greece on January 20, 1996, suddenly found itself facing this crisis. On January 26, Greek politicians and fishermen planted a Greek flag on the rocks, inflaming public opinion in both countries. Turkish journalists responded by planting the Turkish flag on January 27.
Escalation of the Crisis
Unable to tolerate the removal of its flag, the Simitis government landed 12 commandos on the rocks and dispatched four gunboats on January 29, 1996. This act ignited the hot phase of a crisis whose repercussions persist to this day. Türkiye demanded the withdrawal of Greek forces, but Simitis instead conveyed readiness for war. Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos declared in parliament that Greece would neither lower its flag nor negotiate.
At an emergency meeting held on January 30, the Turkish government defined the Greek landing as a violation of Türkiye’s borders and emphasized that Türkiye would not tolerate foreign troops on territory it regarded as its own. Military measures were authorized if necessary.
Türkiye ordered its armed forces to prepare for operations. Units from the Southern Task Group Command in Aksaz had already deployed under Admiral Aydın Gürül. Naval and air units nationwide were on deployment positions. On the night of January 30–31, at 01:40, Turkish SAT (SEAL) commandos passed undetected through Greek naval forces and planted the Turkish flag on the western rock. Shortly afterward, a Greek helicopter crashed, resulting in fatalities.
Faced with escalation, Greece stepped back, influenced in part by advice from U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. On January 31 at 08:00, both sides agreed to withdraw. Within ten hours, all naval units had left the area.
Türkiye’s First State Practice
Türkiye carried out its first and only state practice in a disputed area by risking war. The rapid deployment of naval and air forces—particularly submarines—proved decisive. Greek Chief of General Staff Admiral Limberis later resigned, acknowledging Turkish naval superiority during the crisis. The Navy maintained presence in the area for years, with responsibility later transferred to the Coast Guard.
Had Greece not landed troops on Kardak, the crisis might not have escalated. Simitis’s decision triggered a dormant geopolitical reflex within Türkiye. National honor overtook legal debate. Internationally, Greece’s action constituted aggression under the UN Charter, legitimizing Türkiye’s response.
Contrary to portrayals of a dispute over barren rocks, the real issue concerned the future impact of EGAYDAAKs on maritime jurisdiction, continental shelf, and EEZ claims. These assets controlled approximately 6% of the continental shelf. Kardak symbolized the clash between Türkiye’s maritime awakening and Greece’s unilateral ownership claims.
Before 1995, Türkiye had not raised the disputed status of these assets. An opportunity emerged after 60 years of neglect. Kardak created a new strategic front in the Aegean struggle ongoing since Navarino in 1827. Admiral Güven Erkaya’s leadership was crucial in transforming the crisis into a strategic gain. Parliamentary resolve, reflected in the June 8, 1995, casus belli decision, reinforced Türkiye’s stance.
Following the crisis, the transfer of three U.S. frigates to Türkiye was blocked due to Greek lobbying in Congress, particularly by Senator Spiros Sarbanes. This amounted to a de facto embargo, lifted only after the 1997 Madrid Declaration.
Madrid Declaration of 1997
After January 30, 1996, the Kardak Crisis created a strategic break in which Türkiye broke, on the ground, the thesis that “the Aegean is completely Greek.” Türkiye took the initiative with its naval and air power and introduced the reality of the gray areas into the international literature by actually and legally revealing that there were islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean whose sovereignty was not clearly determined by treaties. However, the United States was deeply disturbed, as the crisis brought two NATO allies to the brink of a hot conflict. W. Holbrooke, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe at the U.S. Department of State, stated essentially the following in his simultaneous message to Ankara and Athens:
“The United States will not allow two NATO allies to go to war over rocks.”
The U.S. aimed to freeze the problem rather than solve it in order to prevent an uncontrolled escalation on NATO’s southeastern flank. In this context, the Madrid Declaration was signed between Türkiye and Greece on July 8, under the mediation of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, following the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit. Although the document in question is not legally binding, it came into force as a “crisis management” document with heavy political consequences. While the declaration tacitly acknowledged that there were problems in the Aegean, it did not define these problem areas and limited Türkiye’s de facto superiority in Kardak to forward moves through vague expressions such as “refraining from unilateral actions and the use of force” and “vital/legitimate interests.”
The declaration allowed Greece to freeze the status quo in its favor and to use the EU process as a tool of political and legal pressure. Thus, although the Kardak Crisis introduced the reality of islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty is disputed, the Madrid Declaration halted the expansion of this gain. By confining Türkiye’s just cause to the framework of “both sides are causing problems,” it led Ankara to shift from de facto deterrence to diplomatic passivity. In this context, although Türkiye adopted extremely important and binding decisions regarding EGAYDAAKs in National Security Council decisions prior to the Madrid Declaration, the names and locations of these islands, islets, and rocks have not been declared to this day due to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ extremely pro-NATO attitude shaped by the Madrid Document.
This situation gave confidence to the other side. Greece accepts this appropriation, which has not been actively challenged by Türkiye until today, as a given right and seeks to consolidate its sovereignty over these assets by continuously applying state practices during the intervening 30 years since January 30, 1996. Today, the arming of the islands in the Aegean, the 12-mile issue, continental shelf delimitation, FIR/airspace, search and rescue, and all discussions related to the Eastern Mediterranean continue to exist as reflections of the fault line opened at Kardak and subsequently covered up, postponed, and left unresolved through Madrid.
Where Are We Today?
The text that best describes where we stand today can be understood from the statement made by our Ministry of National Defense regarding the NAVTEX, which was published indefinitely east of 25 degrees east longitude in the Aegean. The statement is as follows:
“Our navigational announcements, which constitute technical objections to Greece’s activities in the Aegean Sea in violation of international law, are not for two years, as claimed in the Greek press, but have been published indefinitely. Taking into account the safety of navigation through the NAVTEXs we have issued, we emphasize that all research activities within the maritime jurisdiction areas should be coordinated with our country through navigational announcements covering the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, and that carrying out military activities that may endanger the safety of navigation in areas including the territorial waters of non-military islands is contrary to international treaties.”
In such an important statement, not only should the non-military status of the islands have been emphasized, but also the Islands, Islets, and Rocks (EGAYDAAK) whose sovereignty has not been transferred to Greece by treaties. Here lies Türkiye’s most serious problem. Between January 30, 1996, and July 8, 1997, when the Madrid Declaration was signed, the excitement, emotion, and will to assert ownership over the islands, islets, and rocks in question weakened in institutions other than the Naval Forces, and in some of them, it completely disappeared. The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this issue has consistently been to remain passive and to avoid harming the spirit of NATO since the day the crisis emerged.
However, today the power of the Turkish Navy has increased. Diplomacy operates in parallel with power. This increase in power is not an investment for elections or domestic political consolidation, but for positional superiority in foreign policy. Thirty years ago, Greece sought to test the Aegean-centered strategic will of a Türkiye that had become maritime-oriented. Greece initiated this test of its own free will on January 29, 1996. The outcome was in Türkiye’s favor. The reasons for this result were the high readiness of the Navy, the level of power it had attained, and the strategic advantages provided by its new deployment, including Aksaz.
The Navy was incomparably stronger than in 1974, full of energy, and confident about its future. Under the conditions of that time, the Navy proved that it could respond rapidly to any situation that developed during the Kardak Crisis. In addition to the Foça and Aksaz bases in the Aegean Sea, it was able to reach the Aegean in a very short time by transiting the Marmara Sea and the Dardanelles Straits from a confined geography such as Gölcük, and it arrived in the region before the Greek Navy. This rapid deployment provided the Navy with operational superiority and demonstrated its high level of situational awareness.
Today, the same excitement and determination must be demonstrated. Greece has already relegated the Madrid Declaration to its archives. The Greek state continues its practices with all forms of arrogance and audacity. Ankara should display at least as much courage as Greece.
It is not possible to delimit the continental shelf or the Exclusive Economic Zone without resolving the most fundamental sovereignty problem of the Aegean Sea triggered by the Kardak Crisis. The crisis that began in Kardak 30 years ago has still not ended today. The Turkish nation does not forget the existence of 152+ islands, islets, and rocks, and it will not allow them to be forgotten. These rights are never waived. The memory of the nation is patient. Rights are not time-barred.
This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.
Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM.
He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).